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INTRODUCTION
It is a privilege to contribute to this Festschrift for my friend, mentor,
and co-author, Leo Strine, Jr. It is also a pleasure to revisit his vast body of
work and to re-experience the breadth and depth of his scholarship, as well
as reflect on his unparalleled influence on the development of corporate law
that he brought about while presiding over its most influential courts for
twenty-one years.
In thinking about this essay, I recalled a conversation that I had with
“CJS” when I was serving as his law clerk. 1 In this conversation, he decried
(with James Taylor blasting in the background) how institutional investors
discharged their fiduciary duties, directing me to a study that revealed,
*

Associate Professor of Law, USC Gould School of Law. This essay was written for the Penn
Law Review symposium Feschtrift honoring Chief Justice Strine. Many thanks to Elizabeth
Pollman and Leo Strine Jr. for insightful comments and suggestions.
1. “CJ” is the acronym used for the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. I was
lucky to work for him during his first full year bearing that title.
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disappointingly, that so-called “green” mutual funds voted no differently
than their “brown” counterparts. The conversation was a revelation to me;
it launched me on a path of considering how institutional investors wield
their substantial power and what agency problems might stand in the way. 2
As this essay will demonstrate, Chief Justice Strine 3 was one of the first
to highlight these problems (coining the phrase “the separation of ownership
from ownership” 4) and propose reforms. In his final year of judicial service,
he drafted legislation that would crystalize many of these ideas, garnering
support from many legislators. 5 Since that time, he has continued to push
institutional intermediaries to take a broad view of their duties, observing
that their beneficiaries may also be workers, and are always human beings
with interests in clean air and water. 6 In his scholarship and advocacy, Chief
Justice Strine has been extremely influential, driving reforms of governance
practices at major institutions and influencing government bodies at the state
and federal level to focus on these issues. 7
In this essay, I highlight some of Chief Justice Strine’s many
contributions to our understanding of institutional investors, their incentives,
and their duties. In so doing, I focus on his scholarship rather than his
jurisprudence, although these issues have also come up in the latter.8 I also
2. My first project on this subject—The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43
J. CORP. L. 493 (2018)—was a great disappointment to my friend and mentor, who, as will be
discussed, had spent the past decade viewing passive shareholders as an important check on
investor short-termism, and particularly hedge fund activism. Thankfully, CJS and I had a
long history of friendly disagreement, and so I took his dim view of my paper as an invitation
to convince him to take my position seriously, an invitation that I continue to accept in Part
III of this essay.
3. I refer to my friend and mentor as Chief Justice Strine throughout this essay, even
though he bore other titles at different periods of his judicial service, including Chancellor
and Vice Chancellor.
4. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007).
5. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive
Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing between Employees and
Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate
Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in
America’s Future (U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 19–39, 2019),
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3461924.
6. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Stewardship 2021: The Centrality of Institutional Investor
Regulation to Restoring a Fair and Sustainable American Economy (Colum. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 633, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719145.
7. See infra Parts II and III.
8. Interestingly, and somewhat in tension with his advocacy, Chief Justice Strine’s
jurisprudence has emphasized the increasing sophistication of the shareholder base and
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discuss some of the policy proposals that Chief Justice Strine has advanced
that would change the incentive environment for institutional investors, and
also address their outsized influence relative to other corporate stakeholders.
In so doing, I hope to not only reflect on Chief Justice Strine’s extensive
contributions to this area of law, but also influence his many remaining years
of scholarship and advocacy. And in writing this essay, I will highlight
themes that are reflective of Chief Justice Strine’s approach: in particular,
his “clear-eyed” view that takes as his starting point what the law is, rather
than what it should be; his willingness to modernize and humanize stale legal
frameworks; and his desire to make the world a better place for ordinary
people. 9
I.

MAJOR MOVES

It is no overstatement to say that corporate law scholars have been
preoccupied with the problem of separated ownership and control since it
was described by Adolf Berle in 1931. 10 At that time, Berle observed that
greater access to information as support for deferential judicial review of decisions approved
by shareholders. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619
(Del. Ch. 2005) (“And, with increasingly active institutional investors and easier information
flows, stockholders have never been better positioned to make a judgment as to whether a
special committee has done its job.”); In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 530 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (“Market developments in the score of years since have made it far easier, not
harder, for stockholders to protect themselves. With the development of the internet, there is
more public information than ever about various commentators’, analysts’, institutional
investors’, journalists’ and others’ views about the wisdom of transactions . . . . Not only that,
institutional investor holdings have only grown since 1994, making it easier for a blocking
position of minority investors to be assembled. Perhaps most important, it is difficult to look
at the past generation of experience and conclude that stockholders are reluctant to express
positions contrary to those espoused by company management.”). For one example of the
tension between these deference doctrines and voting outcomes, see Sean Griffith & Dorothy
Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151 (2019).
9. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015). Chief Justice Strine
was an inspiring person to work for because he took seriously every single issue that came
before him, whether it be a lawsuit involving a billion-dollar M&A transaction or a protracted
custody battle. Some of our most interesting discussions involved worker’s compensation
disputes, pretty crime, and family court issues, where CJS demonstrated his steadfast
commitment to justice. Indeed, toward the end of his judicial career, CJS focused substantial
efforts to improving Delaware’s criminal justice system, including by authoring the lead
decision holding Delaware’s death penalty statute unconstitutional, and improving access to
justice and addressing systematic racism.
10. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
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dispersed shareholders of large publicly held companies were unlikely to
constrain management, necessitating reforms to minimize what are now
called agency costs. 11 The growth of institutional investors somewhat
changed this picture: by the 1990s, these large blockholders were crowding
out individual investors, 12 leading some observers to claim that they could
put an end to the problems identified by Berle. 13 And yet, things didn’t
exactly play out that way—the largest institutional investors were mutual
funds, which tended to take a relatively passive approach to corporate
governance. 14 Other investors were better positioned to intervene, but
questions about their incentives remained. 15
Understanding how large institutional investor blockholders wield their
substantial power became an important area of corporate governance
scholarship, drawing contributions from heavy hitters and emerging scholars
alike. 16 But before this literature developed into a robust area of scholarly
1049 (1931); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 333–57 (1932); see also Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The
Corporate Governance Machine, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2563 (2021) (reflecting on the fact that
these themes have emerged earlier than 1931).
11. Id.; see also Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Zohar Goshen
& Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017) (discussing “agency-cost essentialism”).
12. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116
Q.J. ECON. 229, 236 (2001) (showing that by 1996, institutional investors held 50% of the
U.S. equity market).
13. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795–853 (1992); Bernard Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1991); Bernard
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575–91 (1990).
14. For early discussions of both the promise and pitfalls of institutional shareholder
activism, as well as proposals for reform, see Ronald J. Gilson & Renier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REGUL. 174, 175 (2001); Jill Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will it Happen and Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009 (1994); see
also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).
15. Romano, supra note 13; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
16. I am unlikely to capture in this note all of the scholarship that has addressed these
problems, but for a small sample, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 15 (discussing hedge fund
incentives); John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (discussing the same);
Romano, supra note 13 (discussing pension fund incentives); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch,
On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in
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inquiry, Chief Justice Strine’s scholarship had repeatedly emphasized the
main themes that have come to shape these conversations: the largest
institutional investors have ample raw power, and yet, they don’t seem to use
it very well, even when judged by the standards of improved corporate
performance and shareholder wealth creation. Instead, they tend to follow
other investors with better incentives to be active in governance, but who
may be pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of long-term growth
and value. In addition, Chief Justice Strine’s early observations about the
individual investors that entrust their money to institutional investor
intermediaries have transformed the way that we think about the duties of
portfolio managers, as well as fiduciary duty more generally. In this Section,
I highlight these themes and how they have evolved in Chief Justice Strine’s
scholarship over the past two decades.
A. Separation of Ownership from Ownership
In 2003, well before long before most corporate law scholars focused
on the problem of flawed institutional intermediaries, Chief Justice Strine
highlighted these issues in an article (with Chancellor Chandler) that
evaluated Sarbanes Oxley’s corporate governance reforms. 17 In discussing
the Act’s definition of independence that looked askance at large
shareholders, the authors pointed out that large institutional blockholders had
the potential to be active participants in governance and in so doing,
represent the interests of the millions of individual investors who entrusted
their capital to them. 18 But rather than participate actively and thoughtfully,
these large institutions had instead “le[ft] the actual hard work of governing
corporations to others.” 19
Chief Justice Strine focused on this misalignment in greater depth in
2006, in his response to Lucian Bebchuk’s influential article, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power. 20 In Toward a True Corporate Republic,
Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 339 (2008) (discussing the same); Gilson &
Gordon, supra note 14 (discussing mutual funds and incentives); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89
(2017) (discussing the same).
17. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 996. The authors, among other things, blamed the fact that institutions “tended
to hold short-term positions.” Id. at 990 n.95.
20. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (2005).
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Chief Justice Strine discussed the practical effect of Bebchuk’s proposals to
empower shareholders: they would serve to empower institutional investors
whose “incentives [were] not identical to those of the individual investors
whose capital they control.” 21 For example, mutual funds often seek to
discharge their duties cheaply, such as by outsourcing votes to ISS; activist
funds and pension funds were driven by other incentives. 22 For that reason,
Chief Justice Strine observed that giving shareholders additional power
would exacerbate problematic power dynamics in corporate America (the
next Sub-Section discusses these dynamics in further detail).
Later writing further developed this theme. By 2007, he had coined the
phrase “separation of ownership from ownership,” i.e., the practical reality
that institutional investor intermediaries had different incentives from the
“end-user investors.” 23 He also signaled his concern that academic
scholarship focused on one problem—the divergence of interests between
corporate management and investors—at the exclusion of the other. 24 Given
the growth of institutional investors and their sizeable role in corporate
governance, this was a major omission. In addition, focusing exclusively on
the agency problems that arise from managerial control of the corporation
gave way to a specific set of recommendations: empower shareholders as a
check on management misconduct. Nonetheless, as Chief Justice Strine
explored in his response to Bebchuk and in later writing, when considering
the problems created by the separation of ownership from ownership,
shareholder empowerment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
strengthening the rights and powers of shareholders would make
management more accountable to shareholders; on the other, doing so would
also benefit activist shareholders, who might not seek to use their power to
benefit the company and its long-term shareholders. This theme culminated
into a plea for corporate law academics to quit “fetishizing” the agency costs
that flow from the separation of ownership and control, and instead focus on
the agency costs that thwart institutional investor stewardship. 25
And although it took some time, corporate law scholars have since
delved into this subject area with fervor, developing theories and modelling

21. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006)
[hereinafter Toward a True Corporate Republic].
22. Id.
23. Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 6–7.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6.
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the “agency costs of agency capitalism.” 26 In this way, Chief Justice Strine’s
writing can be viewed as not only prescient, but also a catalyst for the focus
of corporate law scholarship many years into the future.
B. Flawed Intermediaries
Chief Justice Strine’s insights into the problem of separated ownership
from ownership have shaped much of what came next. In particular, Chief
Justice Strine pointed out several fault lines between the corporate
governance dynamics wrought by institutional shareholders. One key
problem mentioned above is that not all intermediaries have the incentive or
ability to be active participants. In particular, mutual fund blockholders tend
to be deferential to ISS and other profit-seeking proxy advisors and rarely
proactive in governance. 27 This passivity allowed small activist investors,
including hedge funds and public pension funds, to have outsized influence.
The problem, Chief Justice Strine argued, is that these intermediaries do not
necessarily represent the interests of the company and its other shareholders.
In particular, activist hedge funds seek to generate “super-sized returns by
putting pressure on public companies to change their managerial policies,”
generally seeking short-term results. 28 Indeed, given that activist hedge
funds can exit before the risks from their preferred changes manifest (and in
the meantime, can hedge to limit their exposure if their changes backfire),
they have little incentive to push for action to benefit shareholders over the
long term. 29 These critical observations catalyzed a rich debate between
researchers on the effects of hedge fund activism. 30 They also brought about
26. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 14; Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 16;
Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).
27. Indeed, long before many had focused on the limited incentives of index funds, Strine
wrote: “Problematically, those institutional investors whose goals are most in line with
ordinary Americans—those that manage index funds—have rational reasons to be as inert as
possible when it comes to voting shares and influencing issuer behavior . . . . And many
traditional money managers, such as mutual funds, would just as soon dispense with their
votes altogether. They therefore look to proxy advisory firms, such as ISS and Glass Lewis,
in order to give them a rational basis for explaining their voting decisions if questioned about
their compliance with ERISA standards.” Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 16.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 7; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1950 (2017).
30. Compare Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates
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government attention to these issues. 31
Beyond hedge fund activism, Chief Justice Strine’s writing also focused
on another group of active institutional investors: public pension funds.
These investors, he observed, have a different set of concerns that may drive
perverse outcomes for shareholders. Public pension funds are subject to
political pressure, and indeed, may participate in governance to “justify their
employment.” 32 They may also seek outsized returns via some of the same
strategies sought by activist hedge funds to cover “underfunding and past
investment mistakes.” 33
What about mutual funds? As discussed, Chief Justice Strine’s early
work on institutional investors emphasized their passivity, their deference to
proxy advisors who were likewise passive and conflicted, and their failure to
consider the interests of their beneficial owners. 34 Importantly, however,
Chief Justice Strine never gave up on the vision of these intermediaries as
corporate governance saviors, especially given that mutual funds represented
the holy grail in corporate governance—long term holders who bought
shares and stayed the course. As such, the next chapter of Chief Justice
Strine’s writing and advocacy urged those intermediaries to take a full view
of their duties and responsibilities to investors, as will be discussed in the
next Section.
C. Forced Capitalists
In contrast to activist hedge funds, which Chief Justice Strine argued
were likely to seek short-term returns at the expense of long-term value,
Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. L. 1 (2010), and JOHN C. COFFEE & DARIUS PALIA,
THE WOLF AT THE DOOR: THE IMPACT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2015), and Brian J. Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter & Joseph Gerakos, Institutional
Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 26 J. MGMT. ACCT. RSCH., no.
2, 2013, at 123, and Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 1083, and Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A.
Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1290–92 (2008),
with Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741–45 (2008). See also Alon Brav Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge
Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDS. & TRENDS FIN. 185, 221–30 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk
Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1085 (2015).
31. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28
/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/ [https://perma.cc/46MR-98K8] (asking Congress to
close the carried interest loophole).
32. See Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 6; see also Romano, supra note 13 (showing Strine
was one of the first to highlight these incentive issues).
33. See Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 5.
34. See Id.
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mutual funds should be guided by different goals based on the very different
composition of their investors. In light of changes in retirement policy, most
ordinary working Americans have become “forced capitalists.” 35 Unlike
financial spectators, forced capitalists tended to invest their money in the
stock market for the long term, with the goal of having enough funds “to
send their children to college and provide for themselves in retirement.” 36
Many of them are also employees and so they have no interest in “gimmicks
that deliver quick bursts of cash at the expense of sustainable growth.” 37
Likewise, forced capitalists are human beings with an interest in clean air
and water, consumers of products who do not appreciate rising prices, and
employees who depend on living wages, benefits, and a safe working
environment.
The focus on the breadth of interests sought by American investors,
which compose more than half of American households, 38 was also
prescient. Today, scholars in law and finance alike emphasize that corporate
management should focus on shareholder value or welfare, broadly
construed. 39 Such ideas have permeated to the level of government, with the
DOL recently clarifying that ESG factors should be taken into account by
ERISA fiduciaries, 40 and the SEC working to mandate and standardize ESG
disclosure requirements. 41 Not only that, investors are flocking to so-called
“ESG” investment vehicles in record number, proving Chief Justice Strine’s
point that few are interested in wealth maximization at the exclusion of all

35. See Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 4–5.
36. See Id. at 4.
37. See Id.
38. See Kim Parker & Richard Fry, More Than Half of U.S. Households Have Some
Investment in the Stock Market, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/25/more-than-half-of-u-s-households-have-someinvestment-in-the-stock-market/ [https://perma.cc/J56V-SJCR].
39. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017) (arguing that companies should promote
shareholder welfare, rather than market value).
40. See Mary Alcock, Michael Albano & Francesca Crooks, New DOL Proposal on ESG
Investing and Fiduciary Exercise of Shareholder Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Nov. 9, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/09/new-dol-proposal
-on-esg-investing-and-fiduciary-exercise-of-shareholder-rights/ [https://perma.cc/UT7T-H7
ZW].
41. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, SEC, Remarks before the European Parliament
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/gensler-remarks-european-parliament-090121 [https://perma.cc/S94C-SWQH] (“I
have asked SEC staff to develop a proposal for climate risk disclosure requirements for the
Commission’s consideration.”).
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other interests. 42
Moreover, Chief Justice Strine’s genius in emphasizing the holistic
consideration of investor welfare is that it meshed a stakeholder driven
agenda with the traditional power structure of corporate law. And this
reveals a hallmark of Chief Justice Strine’s scholarship: a clear-eyed focus
on what the law is, rather than what it should be. 43 Instead of arguing that
fiduciaries had a legal obligation to pursue stakeholder welfare on the same
footing as shareholders, Chief Justice Strine recognized the privileged place
that shareholders are afforded under Delaware corporate law. 44 Of course,
embedded in this seemingly narrow precept was a missed opportunity. As
the investing class grew and expanded, so should the concept of fiduciary
duty, as Chief Justice Strine demonstrated. This “enlightened shareholder
value” lens has since taken off in the United States, and Chief Justice Strine’s
writing deserves much credit for this phenomenon. 45
Chief Justice Strine’s emphasis on the breadth of investor values in the
modern capital market landscape reveals another important feature of his
jurisprudence and scholarship—his ability to work within traditional
corporate law frameworks and modernize them, to account for changed times
and circumstances. 46 Not only that, it shows his willingness to eschew
traditional economic doctrines when inconsistent with the incentives and

42. See Lizzy Gurdus, ESG investing to reach $1 trillion by 2030, says head of iShares
Americas as carbon transition funds launch, CNBC (May 9, 2021, 10:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/09/esg-investing-to-reach-1-trillion-by-2030-head-ofishares-americas.html [https://perma.cc/RT7U-CX2S]. Chief Justice Strine prefers the term
“EESG,” giving employees privileged stature in the ESG conversation. Strine, Jr., supra note
5, at 8.
43. See Strine, Jr., supra note 9.
44. See Id.
45. See Lund & Pollman, supra note 10, at 2631.
46. His jurisprudence modernizing the Caremark doctrine provides another example.
That doctrine imposes an oversight duty on corporate boards, but had long been a difficult
claim to win. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) (setting forth the duty and then noting that it was “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”). And yet in several
recent decisions, Chief Justice Strine found that plaintiffs had established enough facts to
survive a motion to dismiss. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). In these
decisions, Chief Justice Strine focused on the severity of the directorial lapses, as well as the
severity of the risk that the oversight failures presented to the company. Id. In scholarly
writing, Chief Justice Strine (with co-authors) emphasized that ESG considerations were
properly the subject of board attention pursuant to the Caremark doctrine, drawing on modern
research that showed how a failure to take seriously ESG presented business risk. See Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A
Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and
EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885 (2021).
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preferences of the real people that they involve.47
D. Driving Alignment with Shareholder Values
And yet, despite increased recognition of these varied interests, Chief
Justice Strine observed that many institutional investors continued to
exercise their governance rights in pursuit of financial returns, at the expense
of sustainable growth and community citizenship. For example, Strine
pointed out that many institutions supported stock-buybacks and other
financial maneuvers that have been linked to corporate short-termism. 48 Few
aligned their voting policies with issues that were important to workers and
society more broadly. 49 And once again, Chief Justice Strine’s scholarship
focusing on these deficiencies catalyzed important change.
Take corporate political spending as just one example. In Fiduciary
Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate
Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, Chief
Justice Strine shone a spotlight on the puzzling reality that even as
institutional investors improved in certain areas, such as by increasing
pressure on companies to act ethically, they had adopted policies of total
abdication and deference to management when it came to political spending.
In particular, BlackRock stated in its 2019 proxy voting guidelines that it
“believe[s] that it is not the role of shareholders to suggest or approve
corporate political activities; therefore [it] generally do[es] not support
proposals requesting a shareholder vote on political activities or
expenditures.” 50 Considered alongside Fink’s lofty statements about the
corporation’s role in society and the importance of externality regulation, 51
47. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(“Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies
human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and economics
movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus.”).
48. See Strine, Jr., supra note 4, at 9; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s
Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and
Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1082 (2016). But see Jesse M. Fried
& Charles C.Y. Wang, Are Buybacks Really Shortchanging Investment?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 88.
49. Id.
50. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to
Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political
Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1019 (2020).
51. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter/
[https://perma.cc/VM5X-D643]; see also Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs:
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this position was comically out of touch. Chief Justice Strine rightly pointed
this out and observed that if the largest mutual fund complexes simply
supported disclosure of corporate political spending, much would change.
In the year following the publication of Chief Justice Strine’s article,
BlackRock changed its policy to a much more nuanced one, acknowledging
the risks that come from corporate political spending and stating that it “may
support a shareholder proposal requesting additional disclosure.” 52
Likewise, in recent years, a greater number of institutional investors
have supported shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose their
corporate political spending. 53
To take another example of Chief Justice Strine’s influence over
institutional investor policy, in a 2016 Business Lawyer Article, Securing
Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase
Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, Chief Justice
Strine observed that most large mutual fund complexes were unduly
influenced by outside proxy firms, and rarely exercised their shares in ways
that would benefit the long-term interests of their beneficial owners. 54 He
proposed that mutual funds “accepting 401(k) and college savings
investments [should] have voting policies that take into account the longterm focus of their investors and their need for durable wealth creation.” 55
He further argued that index funds should not rely on proxy advisory firms
that lack fund-specific guidance. 56
Again, Chief Justice Strine’s writing helped to bring about
improvements. Today, each of the Big Three mutual fund complexes eschew
proxy advisor advice for the most important votes, instead developing voting

Purpose & Profit, BLACKROCK (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/4EGF-9AC8]; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s
2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK (2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/E93M-FMVX].
52. See Commentary: BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s perspective on corporate
political activities, BLACKROCK (Dec. 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature
/publication/blk-commentary-perspective-on-corporate-political-activities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UP6-AZX6].
53. See Ephrat Livni, On Voting Rights: It Can Cost Companies to Take Both Sides, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/business/dealbook/votingrights-companies.html [https://perma.cc/QQY8-HVBT] (“In 2019, there were 51 political
spending proposals at S&P 500 companies; none passed, and they received an average of 28
percent support. Last year, of 55 similar proposals, six passed and average support rose to
about 35 percent.”).
54. See Strine, Jr., supra note 48.
55. See Id. at 20.
56. See Id.
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guidelines and resolving issues in house. 57 They have each adopted
specialized policies on environmental and social issues, and have driven real
change by taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve
board diversity at their portfolio companies. 58 Some now allow portfolio
managers greater leeway for to vote their investors’ shares consistent with
the investment thesis of the underlying fund, 59 and have announced that they
will even give certain investors the option to cast their own votes. 60
Ultimately, these examples reveal how Chief Justice Strine’s
scholarship highlighting the identity of mutual fund investors and their
diverse interests has influenced mutual fund policy. And yet, Chief Justice
Strine recognized that advocacy of this kind was unlikely to go as far as
needed to address pressing global problems, which led him to propose
regulatory reforms that will be the subject of the next Section.
II.

SOLUTIONS

Chief Justice Strine’s scholarship has gone well beyond pointing out
flaws in the contemporary corporate governance landscape; indeed, his
articles and speeches contain rich sets of policy proposals, many of which
have been adopted into law or are being seriously considered today. Rather
than summarize them all, this Section first addresses the limits of some of
his ambitious policy proposals involving mutual funds, and second,
highlights some of his sensible proposals to recalibrate our corporate
governance system and its imbalance in favor of institutional shareholders.

57. See, e.g., Proxy Voting and Shareholder Engagement FAQ, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faqglobal.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPG5-ZM7E] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022) (observing that
BlackRock’s investment stewardship team performs independent research and analysis:
“coming to vote conclusions that are consistent with our own voting guidelines and that we
believe are in the best long-term economic interests of our clients. The team does not follow
the recommendations of any single proxy advisor. While we subscribe to research from
several proxy advisory firms, their research is one among many inputs into our vote analysis
process”).
58. See Dorothy Lund, Asset Managers as Regulators, 171 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3975847.
59. See Hortense Bioy et al., Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to
Investment Stewardship, MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 2017), https://www.morningstar.com/content
/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-Stewardship.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7QD-B7DV].
60. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Gives Big Investors Ability to Vote on Shareholder
Proposals, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2021, 1:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrockgives-big-investors-ability-to-vote-on-shareholder-proposals-11633617321
[https://perma.cc/YLG8-MSGP].
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A. Mutual Fund and Index Fund Stewardship
As the previous Section revealed, Chief Justice Strine’s scholarly work
has identified mutual funds, and index funds in particular, as “the most
rational investors.” 61 This is because of index funds’ relatively long
investment horizon—years, rather than days—as well as the composition of
their underlying investors—ordinary people who “patiently save for
retirement,” and who hold a diversified portfolio consisting of the market as
a whole. 62 Starting from those first principles, Chief Justice Strine has
highlighted the lack of the independent thinking exhibited by mutual fund
complexes and their unprincipled voting and engagement policies. 63 He has
further proposed reforms designed to make mutual funds better stewards of
portfolio companies, such as by requiring them to invest greater resources in
stewardship and perform their own independent research. 64
Embedded in these policy proposals are two assumptions: first, that
investors in index funds would be better off if their intermediaries invested
greater resources in stewardship and research; and second, that our corporate
governance system as a whole would work better if mutual funds exercised
their voice more thoughtfully. Another view is possible, however, that might
point toward different solutions: that index funds, despite their buy and hold
investment strategy, are not likely to be corporate governance saviors.
Moreover, investors and society may be worse off if we ask them to fight
their incentives and invest substantial sums in stewardship.
Chief Justice Strine is right to lament the stewardship practices of index
fund providers, which are a byproduct of their low-cost passive investing
strategy. As a result of their business models, the main providers of index
funds rarely initiate interventions at portfolio companies, nor do they invest
in the firm-specific information necessary to exercise governance rights

61. Strine, Jr., supra note 48, at 1092.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Strine, Jr., supra note 6, at 25 (“Requiring a certain level of stewardship by all
institutional investors: My friends Professors Bebchuk and Lund are not wrong that the
leading index funds do not have enough stewardship resources to adequately consider all the
votes that occur. That is why fewer, more meaningful, votes should occur. But another
problem must be addressed: the big index funds do way better than most. If we are going to
encourage institutions to vote, then all of them must be expected to invest in stewardship, so
that perverse pricing pressures do not inhibit stewardship. Absent a return to the Wall Street
rule, an industry-wide expectation of stewardship is essential, so that those trying to do things
right are not undercut by free-riders and the benefits of greater alignment are lost.”).
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sensibly across their broad portfolios. 65 The most we can hope for, therefore,
under the existing state of affairs, is that the corporate governance groups at
these largely indexed institutions will be able to support the right active
investors, and that they will adhere to one-size-fits-all voting policies that
will benefit their investors on average. 66
Assuming they are able to do this, this existing balance of power does
not appear especially problematic. As Jeffrey Gordon and Ronald Gilson
have described, a corporate governance system in which certain active
investors initiate proposals for mutual fund giants to approve or veto may be
close to optimal. 67 In other words, we may not need every investor to invest
in firm-specific information and stewardship so long as we have a threshold
number of active investors, and those relatively passive investors know when
to support them.
There are reasons to be skeptical that passive funds, which again, lack
firm-specific information, will reliably do this. Even so, asking index funds
to invest greater resources in stewardship has its own costs, and in particular,
increasing the costs that investors pay. 68 Index funds offer bottom-of-thebarrel fees because they eschew research and other costs associated with
stock-picking. 69 If they were to truly improve their research and stewardship
efforts across their broad portfolios, which consist of thousands of
companies across the globe, the attenuating costs would hit ordinary
investors hard. 70 Moreover, asking index funds to beef up their participation
would also preserve what has become a troubling corporate governance
dynamic in its own right—an extreme concentration of power in the hands

65. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019); Lund, supra
note 58; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1771 (2020). Chief Justice Strine himself
has noted how the largest fund complexes centralize their governance and generally exercise
all of their votes in the same direction, regardless of the fund’s thesis.
66. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2022),
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3782814; Kahan & Rock, supra note 65.
67. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 14.
68. Lund, supra note 58; M. Todd Henderson & Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Opinion, Index
Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017,
06:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-great-for-investors-risky-forcorporate-governance-1498170623 [https://perma.cc/59BD-W4HF].
69. Id.
70. See Jill Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds, in GLOBAL
SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 454 (Dionysia
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., 2022) (discussing the costs that accompany proposals
to increase index fund participation in governance).
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of a small number of asset managers. 71
This concentration of power in the hands of largely indexed institutions
is likely to continue to grow, however, which may necessitate more drastic
legislative interventions. And if and when passive funds begin crowding out
other investors, my research suggests that the better direction would be to
limit the influence of these powerful but flawed intermediaries in corporate
governance, 72 rather that make them incur costs to fight their incentives,
costs that would ultimately fall on the ordinary investors that Chief Justice
Strine has worked so hard to protect. BlackRock’s decision to pass through
votes to investors that would like to exercise them is a step in the right
direction 73—it ameliorates both the problem of passive, uninformed
blockholders dictating voting outcomes, as well as Chief Justice Strine’s
concern that votes will be exercised by intermediaries in ways that are
counter to their interests.
In sum, I am doubtful that reforms mandating improved index fund
stewardship will necessarily benefit investors or the corporate governance
ecosystem. But there is another concern motivating Chief Justice Strine’s
proposals: the reality of persistent inequality in the United States that has
left workers and other stakeholders in the dust. Specifically, over time, as
the power of institutional shareholders grew enormously, protections for
workers and other stakeholders decreased. 74 Relatedly, the growing
acceptance of a shareholder wealth maximization framework ensured that
corporate surplus accrued to investors and corporate management who were
increasingly compensated in stock, rather than the employees whose labor
contributed to the surplus. 75 To quote my esteemed mentor: “This is not
about the pie not growing. There has been plenty o’ new pie. It is about the
have’s taking a much bigger share of the pie.” 76 Perhaps, therefore, if mutual
funds were bound to consider the ways in which shareholder-centric policies
hurt their investors, corporate governance would contribute to less
71. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve
(Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper, Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139
/ssrn.3247337; Lund, supra note 58.
72. Lund, supra note 58; Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate
Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687, (2019); John Rekenthaler, 3 Solutions for Index-Fund
Voting, MORNINGSTAR (Jun. 14, 2021), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1042975/3solutions-for-index-fund-voting [https://perma.cc/6L3B-MAHQ].
73. Lim, supra note 60; see also Fisch, supra note 70 (considering the benefits of using
pass-through voting to enhance the stewardship potential of index funds).
74. Strine, Jr., supra note 6; Strine, Jr., supra note 5.
75. Strine, Jr., supra note 6; Strine, Jr., supra note 5; see also Zohar Goshen & Doran
Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the American Worker (Colum. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper, Paper No. 653, 2021), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3832069.
76. Strine, Jr., supra note 6, at 18.
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inequality.
Although I support advocacy by Chief Justice Strine and others 77
arguing that the managers of diversified investment portfolios are dutybound to consider environmental and social goals, I am ultimately skeptical
that mutual fund interventions will take us as far as society needs to go in
addressing these important issues. At the end of the day, mutual funds and
their portfolio managers are evaluated based on their portfolio’s relative
performance (and compensated based on the value of the portfolio), which
means that they will generally favor management decisions that create
shareholder wealth, at the expense of workers and society. Not only that,
such reforms do nothing to disrupt the existing balance of power, where
powerful institutional shareholders act like regulators by setting priorities for
companies and determining how to respond to pressing global problems. 78
For those reasons, I believe that the best course of action to address this
source of inequality is to adopt reforms that would empower stakeholders as
a counterweight to institutional investor power. Chief Justice Strine has
developed many important policy prescriptions that would do just this, which
is the topic of my next Section.
B. Improving Protections for Stakeholders to Counterbalance the Rise
of institutional Investor Power
Much of Chief Justice Strine’s advocacy and legislative proposals
address the problem of inequality in the U.S. In particular, Chief Justice
Strine has proposed many thoughtful and sensible reforms that would
improve the voice of workers and communities in relation to institutional
shareholders.
Regarding workers, Chief Justice Strine has proposed that companies
be required to implement a system of European works councils that would
address employee issues at the board level. 79 Such a proposal, if
implemented, would force corporate management to take seriously worker
concerns and issues, and more fairly allocate their corporate surplus. 80 In
77. See also Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV.
1, (2020); Gordon, supra note 66; Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and
Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2020).
78. Lund, supra note 58; Coates, supra note 71.
79. Strine, Jr., supra note 5, at 9; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi
O. Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and
Power Within American Corporate Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2022).
80. See Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy & Benjamin Schoefer, What Does Codetermination
Do? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No 28921, 2021), https:// www.nber.org
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addition, Chief Justice Strine has focused on the benefit corporation as an
important vehicle for change. Benefit corporations require management to
consider, as a matter of fiduciary duty, the interests of stakeholders, in
addition to shareholders. 81 Although nearly every state has benefit
corporation legislation, few large public companies have converted. 82 This
may be because of obstacles in the way; accordingly, Chief Justice Strine has
argued that states should take action to reduce impediments to becoming a
benefit corporation. 83 Chief Justice Strine has also proposed that companies
accepting bailout money should be required to adopt benefit corporation
status—a sensible obligation for companies who are given millions and even
billions of dollars of taxpayer money, and one that would increase
momentum for benefit corporations among large public companies. 84
In addition, Chief Justice Strine has rightly focused on the dynamics
that contribute to the weakening of worker rights and community
protections, and the changed legal environment surrounding corporate
political spending in particular. It is obvious by now that unrestricted
corporate political spending contributes to a political process that privileges
corporate interests at the expense of workers and other groups. As a result,
the legislative process is likely to continue to adopt rules that skew in favor
of corporations, their management, and their shareholders, until the
dynamics that compromise the political environment change. For these
reasons, Chief Justice Strine has offered many sensible proposals, including
that public companies be prohibited from spending money on politics
without a supermajority shareholder vote. 85 Again, assuming shareholders
have values that extend beyond mere profit, such a requirement would keep
companies from making expenditures contrary to shareholder value as it is
/papers/w28921 [https://perma.cc/UHS4-ECUL] (surveying the evidence that certain
mechanisms to involve workers in governance lead to wage increases and within-firm
equality).
81. Strine, Jr., supra note 5, at 5.
82. See Publicly Traded B Corps, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT (July 6, 2021, 11:06 AM),
https://kb.bimpactassessment.net/en/support/solutions/articles/43000632643-publiclytraded-b-corps (noting there are only 4 publicly traded B Corps in the United States).
83. Delaware followed one of his suggestions last year when it amended Section 363 of
the Delaware General Corporate Law to reduce the necessary conversion vote from a
supermajority of shareholders to a simple majority. Elizabeth K. Lange & Elizabeth A.
Diffley, New Amendments to Delaware General Corporation Law Will Make It Easier for
Companies to Become Public Benefit Corporations, FAEGRE DRINKER LLP (July 22, 2021),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2020/7/new-amendments-todelaware-general-corporation-law-will-make-it-easier-for-companies-to-become-publi
[https://perma.cc/9J54-F8K5].
84. Strine, Jr., supra note 5, at 13.
85. Id.
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more broadly conceived. In addition, disclosure would likely chill the most
egregious political spending practices.
Although I lack the space to highlight all of Chief Justice Strine’s good
ideas, these examples demonstrate his willingness to work tirelessly to
address deep and pressing problems, and to create a system of governance
that works for everyone.
III.

CONCLUSION

In addition to being widely recognized as one of the most influential
corporate law judges of the past half century, Chief Justice Strine is also a
prolific corporate law scholar. This essay focused on one aspect of his
scholarly writing: his focus on institutional shareholders, their limitations,
and their potential to bring about a better corporate governance system and
world. It suggested some limits to his advocacy arguing that diversified
mutual fund blockholders can bring about these changes themselves, and
focused on some of his best ideas that would empower other stakeholders to
counterbalance shareholder power. In so doing, it highlighted the aspects of
his writing that have contributed to his lasting impact: his clear-eyed view
of the law and its limits, his ability to modernize stale legal and economic
frameworks, and his desire to make the world a better place for the ordinary
people who live in it.

